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- Evaluating the Effectiveness of Missile Technology Control Regime
- Changes in American Foreign Policy from Obama to Trump Administration
- The United States Drone Program: Ethics and Blowback
- Analyzing EU's stance towards Turkey after the Military Operation in Syria

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Evaluating the Effectiveness of Missile Technology Control Regime

Matthew Conley

Abstract

The advancement of military technology and sophisticated weapons and missiles, gave birth to unprecedented threats to international peace and security. By the end of cold war, the spread of missiles and nuclear technology posed new challenges to world peace. To address apprehensions and roll back this trend, the Group of Seven (G-7) initiated the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). With the aim to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles and missile technology, the world powers attempted to limit the nuclear and missile technology in few hands. The birth of MTCR provided an opportunity to many like-minded countries to unite in the defense of their own strategic interests. However, the MTCR failed in its prime objective to restrict the transfer of missile technology. At the same time, many observers believe that the success of MTCR remained limited to documents. Therefore, this report sheds light on brief background and development of MTCR, clarifies its objectives and goals, and analyzes its success and failures. In conclusion the report offers recommendations to further improve the worthiness of this Regime.

Keywords: Ballistic, Disarmament, Missiles, MTCR, WMD

Introduction

The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is a non-binding international accord. It is a non-treaty association of states that have an established policy for limiting the spread of missiles and missile technology. It was established by the G-7 industrialized countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Great Britain,

and the United States) on April 1987.

The main reason behind the creation of MTCR was to restrain the spread of unmanned delivery systems for nuclear weapons, particularly delivery systems that are capable of carrying a minimum payload of 500kg and minimum of 300 km.

In 1983 France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States initiated the formal discussions on controlling missile proliferation. Later Japan and Canada also joined them and they reached an agreement to control the proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads. It was that point when a nuclear-capable missile was defined as one capable of delivering at least 500 kilograms to a range of 300 kilometers or more. Eventually these events led G-7 countries to formally announce the Missile Technology Control Regime on 16 April 1987.¹

Since MTCR was constructed at the end of the Cold War, it principally focused on the curb the spread of missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons. In order to deal with the escalating proliferation of nuclear weapons, some like-minded countries initiated the MTCR, mainly to curb the proliferation of ballistic missile, nuclear weapons and missile technology by addressing the most destabilizing delivery system for such weapons. At the annual meeting in Oslo in 1992, it was agreed to enlarge the scope of the MTCR's, and its original focus on missiles for nuclear weapons delivery was extended to a focus on the proliferation of missiles for the delivery of all types of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Such proliferation has been recognized as a threat to international peace

1. Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, February 11, 2013.

and security. The regime found a way to counter this threat by keeping a close observation over the transfer of missile equipment, material, and related technologies usable for systems capable of delivering nuclear weapons.

Member States

Today the MTCR membership has grown to 34 nations, in addition to formal members, Israel, Romania, and the Slovak Republic who have agreed to voluntarily follow MTCR Guidelines. Whereas China has agreed to abide by the original 1987 Guidelines and Annex, but China's application for membership still remains under review. In November 2010, US president Barack Obama announced US support for India's bid for permanent membership to UN Security Council, as well as his support for India to join the Missile Technology Control Regime.²

The following countries are the current member of the regime, and their year joining the MTCR: Argentina (1993), Australia (1990), Austria (1991), Belgium (1990), Bulgaria (2004), Brazil (1995), Canada (1987), Czech Republic (1998), Denmark (1990), Finland (1991), France (1987), Germany (1987), Greece (1992), Hungary (1993), Iceland (1993), Ireland (1992), Italy (1987), Japan (1987), Luxembourg (1990), Netherlands (1990), New Zealand (1991), Norway (1990), Poland (1997), Portugal (1992), Republic of Korea (2001), Russian Federation (1995), South Africa (1995), Spain (1990), Sweden (1991), Switzerland (1992), Turkey (1997), Ukraine (1998), United Kingdom (1987), United States of America (1987).³

In order to review and evaluate the MTCR's activities, and to reaffirm their support and reinsure the

continuity of exchanging information and views on missile programme developments, member states hold Plenary Meeting each year.⁴

Objectives and Goals of MTCR

The primary goal of MTCR is to limit the risks of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (i.e. nuclear, chemical and biological weapons) by controlling the transfers that could contribute to make unmanned aircraft delivery systems for such weapons. MTCR Partners recognize the importance of controlling the transfer of missile-related technology without disrupting legitimate trade and acknowledge the need to strengthen the objectives of the Regime through cooperation with countries outside the Regime.

MTCR partners stick to its guidelines for export control policy, to which all countries are encouraged to adhere unilaterally. The regime guidelines consist of national control laws and procedures; a two-category common control list; information-sharing on any denied cases to ensure no commercial advantage; no impediment to national space programs; presumption of denial of any transfers in terms of nuclear weapon delivery systems development; and no retransfers without authorization.⁵

The Regime's Annex - list of controlled items - including virtually all key equipment, materials, software, and technology needed for missile development, production, and operation. The Annex is divided into two parts: Category I and Category II items.

Category I items include complete rocket and unmanned aerial vehicle systems (including ballistic missiles, space launch vehicles, sounding rockets,

2. Al Jazeera News English, "Obama seeks expanded India-US trade", Nov 7, 2010. Accessed at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia/2010/11/2010116132349390763.html>

3. Membership of Nonproliferation Export Control Regimes, HCOC and PSI, Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes, July 31, 2012.

4. Public Statement from the Plenary Meeting of the Missile

Technology Control Regime, Norwegian Presidency 2014-2015, October 3, 2014. Accessed at: <http://www.mtcr.info/english/press/Norway2014.doc>

5. Regime Goal and Guidelines, Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, February 11, 2013.

cruise missiles, target drones, and reconnaissance drones), capable of delivering a payload of at least 500 kg to a range of at least 300 km, their major complete subsystems (such as rocket stages, engines, guidance sets, and re-entry vehicles), and related software and technology, as well as specially designed production facilities for these items.

Pursuant to the MTCR Guidelines, exports of Category I items are subject to an unconditional strong presumption of denial regardless of the purpose of the export and are licensed for export only on rare occasions. Additionally, exports of production facilities for Category I items are prohibited absolutely.

Category II items include propulsion and propellant components, launch and ground support equipment, less-sensitive and dual-use materials for the construction of missiles, as well as other complete missile systems capable of a range of at least 300 km, regardless of payload. Their export is subject to licensing requirements taking into consideration the non-proliferation factors specified in the MTCR Guidelines. Exports judged by the exporting country to be intended for use in WMD delivery are to be subjected to a strong presumption of denial. The transfer of Category II items is less restricted, but still requires end-use certification or verification where appropriate.⁶

MTCR partners regularly exchange information about relevant national missile non-proliferation export licensing issues in the context of the Regime's overall aims. A Plenary Meeting is held annually and chaired on a rotational basis. In addition, inter-sessional consultations take place monthly through Point of Contact (POC) meetings in Paris, while Technical Experts Meetings are held on an ad hoc basis. The MTCR has no secretariat; distribution of the Regime's working papers is carried out through a "point of contact" the functions of which are performed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France.⁷

When it comes to assessing the legality of exports of certain controlled items, the Missile Technology Control Regime require the intended recipient to pledge not to transfer the goods or their replicas to a third country without prior permission from the country originally transferring the goods.

The MTCR also identifies five guidelines that should be taken into account when assessing the legality of exports.⁸

1. The recipient must not be pursuing or must not have any ambitions of acquiring WMD.
2. The intended recipient should clarify their purposes and capabilities of missile and space programs.
3. The proposed transfer should not make any possible contribution to the development of delivery systems for WMD.
4. The recipient should have well established credibility of the stated purpose for the purchase.
5. The potential transfer should not conflict with any multilateral treaty.

Success and Failures of MTCR

Just two weeks after the MTCR established in 1987, Iraq conducted its first successful flight test of extended-range ballistic missile. Later Israel conducted its "The Jericho II" missile test in 1987, 1988 and 1989, during the same time India also conducted its own missile tests (Prithvi in 1988 and Agni in 1989), the course was followed by Pakistan's Hatf II missile test in 1989, and then North Korea's the Nodong in 1993. In late 80s and early 90s, China also transferred its CSS-2 missiles to Saudi Arabia and M-9 and M-11 missiles to Pakistan. MTCR was facing serious challenges and was unable to tackle the situation. Even the most

6. The official Missile Technology Control Regime website. Accessed at: <http://www.mtcr.info/english/>

7. Objectives of the MTCR - Missile Technology Control Regime official website. Accessed at: <http://www.mtcr.info/english/objectives.html>

8. Rizwan Asghar, "Making MTCR effective", Daily Times, June 03, 2014. Accessed at: <http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/opinion/03-Jun-2014/making-mtcr-effective>

enthusiastic supporters of MTCR acknowledged that not only did the MTCR fail to slow down the missile programs of India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan but may have in fact provided an incentive for weakening domestic support to their indigenous programs.

The case of Iran reveals one of the major failures of MTCR. Even after joining the regime, Russia continued to supply advanced technology, components, and personnel to Iran for its missile program. Despite clear evidence of Russian violations of the MTCR, the United States as well as other member states failed to invoke the sanctions against Russia for violations or to restrain the proliferation.

MTCR met another failure, when China supplied missile-related technology to Iran. Although Chinese government pledged to accept the regulations of MTCR, yet the violations and transfer of missile technology have continued, and MTCR failed to take action against China or impose sanctions. Consequently, the Iranian missile program progressed rapidly and Iran enhanced its capabilities for developing and producing local long-range missiles.⁹

Despite the regimes' limitations and incapability to restrain India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan to develop their missile programs, the MTCR has shown some progress in slowing down or stopping several ballistic missile programs. According to the Arms Control Association, "Argentina, Egypt, and Iraq abandoned their joint Condor II ballistic missile program. Brazil, South Africa, and Taiwan also shelved or eliminated missile or space launch vehicle programs. Some Eastern European countries, such as Poland and the Czech Republic, destroyed their ballistic missiles, including some Soviet-era Scuds, in part, to better their chances of joining MTCR in 1993."¹⁰

When Iraq conducted its first flight test "Al-Hussein", their missile program was heavily dependent on foreign procurement and, hence, it was vulnerable to a supply cut-off. Although, Iraqis were able to develop Al-Hussein, but due to MTCR efforts, and limitations Iraq was unable to achieve its ultimate missile objective.

Disarmament of Argentina's Condor II project, the cancellation of two Brazilian systems (Avibras's SS series and Orbita's MB series), delaying India's missile program, delaying China's sales of M-9 and M-11 missiles to Pakistan and encouraging Germany to improve its export control enforcement legislation are considered to be great achievements by MTCR.

So it appears that the MTCR played a decisive role in reducing ballistic missile programs capable of delivering nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons in some non-MTCR countries.

Although some of the countries such as Egypt, Iraq, and Syria have given up their ballistic missile programs capable of delivering chemical and biological weapons, but they are still believed to be seeking to acquire these weapons through other means.

On the other hand, India, Pakistan, Iran, North Korea and Israel with varying degrees of foreign assistance, have been continuously deploying medium-range ballistic missiles with more than 1,000 kilometers range. Some of the MTCR non-member countries are also transferring their missile technology to other countries. North Korea is considered as the primary source of ballistic missile proliferation. Iran has supplied missile technology to Syria. Sometimes events such as these put a question mark in the effectiveness of the MTCR. At the same time, some non-member countries also believe that Missile Technology Control Regime is sometimes used to benefit its founding members, and globalize their agendas.

9. Gerald Steinberg, "The Failure of the MTCR in the Middle East", Ariel Center for Policy Research (ACPR), Policy Paper No. 30. Accessed at: <http://www.acpr.org.il/publications/policy-papers/pp030-xs.html>

10. Daryl Kimball, "The Missile Technology Control Regime at a Glance", August 2012 <http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/mtrcr>

Conclusion

Since the establishment of MTCR, the membership of the group has expanded to 34 countries and five other states have unilaterally pledged to adhere to the guidelines of MTCR. Though, the expansion of membership led to the diffusion of goals and statements of the MTCR. As membership grows, the Regime loses focus and core objectives are often being sacrificed. The consensus is also increasingly difficult to achieve on many politically sensitive issues.

The Regime has successfully slowed down the pace of development of missile technology, however due to its duplicity of approach it has largely failed to prevent its spread to other countries and has often ignored the cruise missile technology prevention efforts.

At the same time, MTCR is often being criticized by the observers for being an exclusive club and serving the interests of some major powers, especially the United States.

The Missile Technology Control Regime has definitely slowed down or delayed the proliferation process of nuclear and missile technology, and reduced the rate and size of the flow. Nevertheless the Regime clearly failed to accomplish its stated goal, which is to stop the proliferation of missile and nuclear technology, especially to the instable and chaotic regions.

As more and more countries successfully developing and advancing their missile programmes with foreign assistance, the MTCR might face serious challenges in the years to come. The Regime also lacks the required regulatory framework to check the development of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

At the same time, many other non-member states have continuously remained involved in selling and transferring missile technology to other countries. Due to the lack of regulatory structure and its voluntary nature, the MTCR cannot mandate any forceful action against member countries violating its guidelines. With rapidly increasing threat of the

missile technology proliferation, The MTCR urgently needs to improve its mechanism and equip itself to address all the concerns and tackle new challenges.

Recommendations

- The MTCR needs to establish an efficient panel or mechanism, in order to address the security concerns, as well as to encourage the peaceful talks and negotiations for missile reductions.
- As the MTCR is a voluntary arrangement, it does not have the ability to sanction member states that violate its guidelines. For that reason there should be a legally binding instrument and effective punishment and sanctions
- Since MTCR is not a treaty-based regime, therefore it merely acts as a supplier cartel and is often considered ineffective to address the missile proliferation problem, and lacks formal international legal standing.
- The MTCR should strictly compliance and abide with its original outline and policies. As in October, the Republic of Korea and the United States agreed to extend the range of the South Korea's ballistic missiles to 800km. This range is beyond the guidelines set down in the MTCR.¹¹
- Nowadays a chemical or biological warhead could weigh less than 500-kilogram payload, therefore MTCR can also amend its original payload or range limits.
- The regime should further make efforts to expand the international effort to discourage missile proliferation and support peaceful uses of technology.
- There is an urgent need for the member states to create a just and effective export control law and enforcement.
- The MTCR should impose increased transparency in the exports of sensitive technologies.

11. Simon Mundy and Michiyo Nakamoto, "US eases South Korea missile restrictions", Financial times, October 7, 2012. Accessed at: <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/5211903e-1052-11e2-a5f7-00144feabdc0.html>

Changes in American Foreign Policy from Obama to Trump Administration

Merve Erol

Abstract

Leaving behind the traditional isolationism policy, post World War II United States started to embrace a global engagement policy. The country has become an arbiter in the 'handmade' liberal global order with leading sanction powers. Subsequent to the significantly important process of Cold War, the US bears the super power role by defeating the Soviet Union which the US was in a long time competition with. Besides analyzing main principles and regions affecting and shaping the American foreign policy which tends to swing between interventionism and isolationism, this paper will discuss the glances and practices of policies determined by Obama and Trump administrations and look into the changing methods of these two different sides of America. The main purpose is to examine main focuses of foreign policy which consists mostly around four significantly important regions; Middle East, North Africa, Europe, China and Russia from the realist perspective with the belief that foreign policy affairs occurs around the idea of self-help element of realism. In 2008, Barack Obama appeared as a sunlight on the road to peace by calling Arabian communities to 'not to afraid of new changes' in his speech made in Cairo.¹ Obama speech left signs of fixing the distorted image of the US by transmitting Bush's 'hard power' policy to 'soft power' according to some scholars.² By the end of his presidency, Obama seem inconsistent in most of the foreign policy issues and with the belief of that Obama's 'soft power' policy and his unstable views and acts weakend the United States, with Donald Trump in the presidential seat all

bitter attitudes in his speeches were being considered as rough, dangerous and exclusionary.³

Introduction

As a significant turning point of the international world order after 9/11, Bush administration declared some of the countries of MENA region as 'rogue states' and potential threats. Afterwards there have been some important moves such as Afghanistan war and invasion of Iraq. In the Middle East and North Africa region in specific, around the world in general, the United States left a bad image by acting as an aggressor upon the significant actors of the region.

By the end of 2007 starting from Middle East, the American antagonism spreaded all over the world even in some European countries. According to some scholars, the US foreign policy tends to swing between interventionism and isolationism.

When Barack Obama came to the presidency he tried to find a stable and moderate middle ground.⁴ In both the speeches made by Obama in Egypt and Turkey, he emphasized the importance of peaceful relations with the Islamic world and effects of this kind of integration all around the world. He asserted that this bad image of America must be changed immediately by using 'soft power' in the foreign policy. Thus, President Donald Trump alleged the same approach that deteriorated power of the country should be fixed in the way of any certain policies and acts.

1. Kaplan Fred, "Report of Obama's Foreign Policy", January 4, 2016, <http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/gorus/obamanin-dis-politika-karnesi>

2. Cord Roskin, Jones Medeiros, Political Science – an introduction, 12th Edition, Pearson Education, United States, 2012, p.346

3. Appadurai Arjun, "Tiredness of Democracy", Büyük Gerileme, Heinrich Geiselberger(prep) ,Berlin, April 2017,

4. Cord Roskin, Jones Medeiros, Political Science – an introduction, 12th Edition, Pearson Education, United States, 2012, p.346

Foreign Policy of Obama Administration

Starting from the election campaigns, Barack Obama stated the importance of human rights and democracy nearly in every speech. These approaches to the global realistic order expected to be held as an example to implement in Middle East and North Africa region as well as other problematic parts of the world. Instead of carrying on Bush administration's policy of taking democracy to the needy Islamic countries, Obama preferred establishing peaceful relations with the regional states under the banner of mutual respect. By avoiding using hard power in internal and external affairs Obama administration opted building diplomacy-based relations with strategic actors.⁵

First of all, Obama set out the policies in direction of withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan. Obama administration aimed at refinement available relations with allies such as Turkey and Israel.⁶ As opposition to Bush's unilateralism and aggression, he created a different atmosphere by his multilateral approach to local and global issues. Obama's foreign policy principles of building various cooperation and dialogues intended to fix the broken relations with China and Russia.⁷

To its traditional allies in Europe, Obama aimed to develop cooperations on multiple floors. To its traditional allies in Europe, Obama aimed to develop cooperation on multiple floors. Besides, one of the primary rhetoric of Obama was to determine policies in order to prevent nuclear and other dangerous weapons around the world and to build security infrastructures. In general, what Obama pursued to

establish was smooth policy view in both political and economic levels.⁸

In early days of Obama in the office, he pointed out that his main foreign policy goals consists of preventing global hunger, global warming and building security infrastructures, constructing multilateral cooperation to stop nuclear and other dangerous weapons. Instead of focusing more on the economic and political issues and taking aggressive attitude, he preferred to focus more on resolving the conflicts by dialogues, promoting freedom of speech, equal rights for women, and by highlighting the importance of law and justice. From economic point of view, Obama blamed the policies of investing in military and continuation of the Iraq and Afghan invasions as the cause of the economic worsening. In order to ameliorate consequences of the economic crisis of 2008, Obama administration aimed not to invest much on military equipment.

Notwithstanding, there was a strengthened China in Asia-Pacific and with the aim of not to lose power in region he wanted to follow an active and stabilizer policy. There have also been some diplomatic and economic policies adopted in this way but while stating the importance of not to focus more on military equipment Obama administration changed policies in a way when it was realized the unstoppable development of China and its reinforced military bases in the Pacific. On the economic and trade side they supported the Trans-Pacific Partnership with the belief in it's a high quality trade and investment platform. Obama administration was becoming aware of the fact that America's future economic prosperity was mostly connected to Asia region and there may be a possibility of shifted focus from Middle East to Asia.

5. Öztürk Ersoy Tuğçe, "Reconstruction of American Foreign Policy Through Obama Image", TASAM, July 2009, http://www.tasam.org/tr-TR/Icerik/1102/barack_obama_imaji_uzerinden_amerikan_dis_politikasinin_yeniden_insasi

6. Kardaş Şaban, Obama's Heritage and Trump US Foreign Policy, Discussion Program, January 21, 2017, ORSAM

7. Prof. Dr. Ateşoğlu Güney Nurşin, Clinton-Obama'nın Reddedilen Dış Politika Mirası, BILGESAM, Kasım 2016, <http://>

www.bilgesam.org/incele/2552/-clinton-obama'nin-reddedilen-dis-politika-mirasi/#.WSKvWYyLTIV

8. Ermağan İsmail, Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Dönemde ABD Dış Politikası - Obama Dönemi ve Ak Parti, Elektronik Siyaset Bilimi Araştırmaları Dergisi, Haziran 2012, Cilt: 3, Sayı:2

On the other side, Obama administration believed that the relations between Russia and the United States should be improved and acted indulgently on related the issues. In the first half of his presidency, Obama required cooperation principle with Moscow and he called this policy as 'reset policy' which was planned to correct the deteriorating relations in the Bush period.

But soon after, Obama couldn't see any future to this approach due to the fact that Russia was turning this to an advantage for its own sake. Russia's invasion of Crimea in 2014 and military interventions to the Syrian conflict since 2015 wasn't seen as a surprise. The deployment of Russian troops and war machines in the Middle East and Black Sea regions disturbed American allies in Europe. In order to relieve allies against those acts of Putin, Obama administration was stuck in a tough situation and had to increase the armament in the region. Sanctions against Russia along with the European allies on Ukraine issue, caused tension in bilateral relations between the two sides.

On the other hand, Middle East which is seen as an important geostrategic region with political, economic and cultural features, planned policies of Obama was in line with being able to prevent the expansionism of Iran at the beginning. Considering such an aim, the US supported the agreement between Iran and five permanent members of the UN and Germany in 2015. However, reluctant acts of the US in defending the democracy and multilateralism and inadequate support to the citizens of the region who want their fundamental rights during the Arabian Spring shows that the Obama administration didn't follow the way they set at the beginning.⁹

Obama condemned the persecution of Assad administration in Syria strongly, called for the change of regime. In case of using chemical weapons, he

warned Assad that the United States would intervene in the region if the red line was crossed by the regime.¹⁰ Despite the violations of all those warnings during the process there has been no intervention act by America. Because of his inadequate support during the Arabian revolts which started in Tunisia with spreading almost every Arabian state, dictatorships became stronger and chaos engulfed the region. That result brought the idea of an unsolved foreign policy issue.

Another important issue was the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Obama administration supported the mutual land exchange policy and he declared that the US didn't accept 'the legitimacy of continued Israeli settlements'. Obama and his administration were opposed to the illegal settlements of Israel in Palestinian lands. That policy can be count as a turning point in American long time foreign policy. Shortly after of this decision, Obama took strong reactions from Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu that is clearly opposed to a two-state solution.

Furthermore, the relationship with the traditional allies in Europe reduced to a larger extent and trade and investment cooperation faced hurdles, and disturbance emerged between these two main Western actors. Economic problems that some of the European countries had since 2008 effected the US economy in a negative way. Therefore, it was believed that there is some uncontrolled strategic regional partnership. American foreign policy on Middle East, Eastern Europe and actions that allowed control to pass to Russia in large disturbed the allies in Europe.

At the end of his presidency, Obama left an incomplete mission in Asia, unresolved issues and chaos in Middle East, remaining Israel-Palestine conflict, regression in economic growth, unstoppable nuclear forces and dissatisfied allies looking towards the new president Donald Trump.

9. Kanat Kılıç Buğra, "Obama'nın İkinci Döneminde Amerikan Dış Politikası", SETA Analiz, May 2014, No:93

10. Davutoğlu Ahmet, Obama'dan Trump'a: Çıkarılacak Dersler ve Karşılaşılacak Zorluklar, February 2, 2017, <http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/gorus/obamadan-trumpa-cikarilacak-der-sler-ve-karsilasilacak-zorluklar>

Donald Trump Administration

After the transmission policy of Obama from 'hard power' to 'soft power', Donald Trump became the 45th president of the United States and going back to the aggressive policy and emphasis on the 'hard power'. President Donald Trump caused great repercussions and controversies all around the world with his aggressive image and speeches. President Trump argued that Russia is becoming a great power, countries like China, India appeared as super powers in Asia, Iran showed expansionist policies in the Middle East and therefore America lost its global power. During the election campaign he gave the clue to the world that there will be fundamental changes in both internal and external policies under his presidency. It was obvious that Trump was favorable to Israel and praised Putin's Russia many times. Through social media he made harsh discourses against China. While his speech with the expression of 'America First' gave the world clue of an exclusionary image and the view that he will act according to the realist ideology in terms of foreign policy.¹¹

Trump continued to display unilateral and conservative policies with both his speeches and implementations. On a large scale, policy views of Donald Trump are shaping around the anti-globalization view. He argues that globalization has lost strength and tolerance and dialogue-oriented policies made other regional powers more active and powerful. In terms of foreign policy, President Trump claimed the strategic importance of Eastern Asia, Gulf and Europe.

Unlike Obama, Trump administration supported military operations overseas. He started to reconsider some of the global economic or political cooperation

and treaties developed during Obama administration. He thinks that cooperation is causing decrease in wealth and prestige. By implementing certain policies he tried to regain political and economic strength of America. Because of uncontrolled global cooperation and treaties, foreign investments, international trade and finance, labor movements and migration affairs he asserted that the military superiority and economic growth of the United States are in a decline and they need radical changes. He seems consistent to this aim with his practices from the very first day in office. Through cultural purification inside, he aims to be an isolated global power again. He blames Islamic religion directly for global terrorism.¹² By the policies of Trump to remove this situation from global order we can witness that they are sharply separated from Obama's policies.¹³

In the early days of his presidency he banned the entry of seven Muslim populated counties' citizens into the US. He showed a stiff attitude to the refugees especially to the Muslims migrating to the West. Trump administration built regional cooperation in order to create security zones in Syria and get rid of migration affair. Trump administration's military steps in Middle East and military support to the Democratic Forces of Syria and YPG in their combat with ISIS overland also proved that he wanted to take the war to enemy's lands.

Although the Kurdish people supported Trump as the President of the United States with the belief of taking advantage during their struggle for independence¹⁴, which did not prove to be the case as Trump administration abandoned the community after they were used to serve the US and allies' interests. According to researchers, Trump administration cleverly avoided long-term alliances in the Arabian region.

11. Kardaş Şaban, American Foreign Policy of Trump Administration and Turkey, *Ortadoğu Analiz Dergisi*, January-February 2017, Vol:9 No: 78

12. Appadurai Arjun, "Tiredness of Democracy", *Büyük Gerileme*, Heinrich Geiselberger (prep), Berlin, April 2017

13. Akdoğan İsmail, "Possible Foreign Policy of Donald Trump in Middle East and Gulf States" *Ortadoğu Analiz*, January-February 2017, Vol:9 No:78

14. Robin Wright, "President Trump's Surprisingly Warm Welcome in the Middle East" *The New Yorker*, 10.11.2016, <http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/president-trumps-surprisingly-warm-welcome-in-the-middle-east>

Donald Trump also asserted that the United States will be ready to cooperate with Russia in order to put an end to ISIS.¹⁵ Acting together with Russia, Trump and Putin both think that a more stable environment will be achieved in the region. What Trump seeks is to ameliorate the deteriorated relations with the regional allies especially with Israel. He aims to give priority to Israel which was abandoned during Obama administration. As a matter of fact, Israel has been most satisfied with President Trump. On the contrary to Israel, tension in bilateral relations with Iran in this new period seems to be dominant one. An important reason of Trump targeting the region was termination of the nuclear agreement which was signed in 2015 with Iran and that seriously disturbed Iran. Moreover, Trump continued to criticize the policies of Obama administration claiming that the uncertain acts in the region made Iran stronger.¹⁶

Similar to Obama administration, China stands into the center of foreign policy vision of Trump and his team. They see China as the biggest threat to America in economic and political arena in new world order. It's increasing development in Asia, China got enough time and leverage to gain economic power in advancing military presence and today it constitutes one of the main elements of American foreign policy. The relationship of these two states which will continue in the new term will have considerable effects on the global order. In this context Russia appears as a significant ally for the US in Asia- Pacific region against possible Chinese hegemony.¹⁷

Trump, who hasn't claimed anything unfavorable about Putin or Russia, believes that many problems worldwide can be solved by acting together. Most of their views intersect at a common point. Both

the American and Russian leaders believe that there are many opportunities to cooperate when looking from the realist perspective of international relations. Both sides believe that the positive atmosphere in bilateral relations will be mutually beneficial. In terms of foreign policy, they both assert that the most critical security issue that the world faces is the global terrorism originating from the Middle East. Furthermore, the Trump administration believes that Russia would be a balance factor against China's rising power in Asia.

Throughout his campaign Donald Trump supported a policy of decreasing other countries' reliance on the policies of the U.S. He entails reducing foreign economic and military commitments with some of the allies in Europe. He considers European Union as a threat to American economy and military power. Thus he supported Brexit and remains sympathetic to populist parties of other EU members. The foreign policy set by the Trump administration was to reduce traditional European support in this context. Otherwise, a possible closeness between United States and Russia would affect the relations with Europe. The Trump administration also took some significant steps on geostrategic regions with regional allies such as Turkey. The politics determined at the point of struggle against terrorism (ISIS, PKK) and the crisis of Syria will be ensuring the security of Turkey and consolidate relations with Ankara.

Conclusion

The analysis suggests that the foreign policy is a difficult area of governance because of the facts of abilities and preferences and many states involvement. It is necessary to consider that the global order and

15. Prof. Dr. Ali Othman, "Middle East Policy of Donald Trump and Kurds", ORSAM Bölgesel Gelişmeler Değerlendirmesi, December 2016, No: 55

16. (ibid)

17. Kösebalaban Hasan, "Will Trump Change the American Foreign Policy?", January 2017, <http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/gorus/trump-amerikan-dis-politikasini-degistirebilecek-mi>

positions of actors in it change continuously over time. This change can sometimes be shaped by the attitudes of state officials.¹⁸ Therefore, governors can make some mistakes which are conceptualized in the discipline of international relations such as misperception that some analysts claim Obama had during his administration.¹⁹

Some critics believe that Obama should have foreseen that there would be consequences of refrain of using military power. Primary result emerging with the paper is that the administration of Obama removed American antagonism with his perceived idealist and peaceful perspective. Therewithal, a perception appeared that his promise to restore old economic and political strength didn't succeed. Obama and his team criticized in two specific places; failure to bring an effective solution to the crisis of Syria and failure to provide strength in Eastern Europe.

The period when Trump took over the presidential task was of crucial importance because of unstable and chaotic situation in the Middle East, as well as competition of hegemonic powers in Asia. In this critical global environment Trump administration emphasized on the importance of improving relations with existing allies and obtainment of new ones by acting according to real-political views. In this context, Trump and his team stressed on strengthening economic and defence power of the United States with permanent solutions to crisis in Middle East and to migration affair instead of wasting too much time there.

Trump's harsh speeches about refugees migrating to the West and other different identities sharply separate him from Obama. By creating a new wave of protectionism in foreign policy he wants an isolated

and strong America in global scale again which can be claimed resembling to the Pre-World War II America.

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The United States Drone Program: Ethics and Blowback

Policy Recommendation: Scale Back the Use of Weaponized Drones in Non-Combat Zones

Casey Higginbotham

Introduction

*“Dear Obama, when a U.S. drone missile kills a child in Yemen, the father will go to war with you, guaranteed. Nothing to do with Al Qaeda,”*¹ - Yemeni Lawyer on Twitter

This narrative from Yemen has become a familiar story along the Arab Peninsula and Pakistan, a five-hundred pound bomb is detached from an MQ-9 reaper (Drone), cruising at 50,000 feet above, the laser guided bomb explodes on impact devastating everything within a hundred yard radius. There is considerable evidence that argues weaponized drone usage within non-combat zones is hampering the United States goal of combating terrorists. With the rise of ISIL, an examination of the negative repercussions resulting from the United States over reaching drone program is necessary. In doing so one will find that the strikes are in fact damaging public opinion and support for American policy and more importantly is motivating extremists into violent resistance in order to attempt to stop this aggressive US program.

On October 22, 2013 Al-Jazeera reported “White House Defends Drone Program against War Crime Claim,” ‘the report came out based off Amnesty International’s claims that the United States has breached international law via drone attacks in Pakistan and Yemen.² Expectedly the U.S. officials strongly disagreed with the findings, they quickly responded releasing a statement that the drone program is in full compliance of international law. In the new report Al Jazeera made note of Amnesty International’s request for greater pellucidity in the drone program, citing both the C.I.A. and the presidential administration’s lack of transparency in the ongoing drone program.

Contained in the article was the Human Right report which went examined six drone strikes and the aftermath that followed, highlighting the international issues with this far foreign policy tool.

This and many other reports come in response to the dramatic increase in drone strikes throughout non-combat zones over the past few years. There have been countless pleas from countries and international rights groups for the Obama administration to not only release details about the drone strikes, but to terminate the controversial program altogether. Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif urged this point when he directly called for “an end to drone attacks” in a meeting with president Obama back in November, 2013.³ However, we all see this too often in countries receiving US aid; opposition in public, but consent of leadership behind closed doors. Inevitably without widespread domestic opposition to the onslaught of drone strikes, there will surely be no change in American policy.

To further contextualize how drastically this type of warfare has increased, in 2009 there was only one drone strike in Yemen, by 2012 there were forty-one.⁴ In comparison to just five years ago, the drone program has grown at an alarming rate. This goes to show that drone use has become a central part of the Obama Administration’s evolving strategy in the “War on Terror.” There are obvious ethical concerns with drone strikes such as civilian casualties, minimal transparency, and noncompliance with the Fourth Geneva Convention which established protection of civilian personnel during wartime in 1949.⁵ These concerns have not proven to be an effective agitator to prevent the United States government from halting the drone program. With growing media attention

1. Ibrahim Mothna. “How Drones Help Al-Qaeda” New York Times June 13, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/14/opinion/how-drones-help-al-qaeda.html?_r=0 accessed: January 1, 2014.

2. “White House Defends Drone Program Against ‘War Crime’ Claims” Al-Jazeera. (October 22, 2013) <http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/10/22/whitehousedefendsdroneprogramagainstawarcrimeclaim.html>.

3. Ibid 2.

4. Bill Roggio, Bob Barry. “Charting the Data for US air strikes in Yemen, 2002-2014” The Long War Journal. (May 12, 2014) <http://www.longwarjournal.org/multimedia/Yemen/code/Yemen-strike.php>.

5. Geneva Convention Relative to Protection of Civilian Person, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316.

and international opposition to the strikes, it is necessary to determine how effective this counter terrorism tactic is. Thus, I pose the question: Is the United States drone strikes undermining America's security?

Public Opinion

A 2013 Gallup Poll showed 65% of American support for drone strikes abroad.⁶ Thus, around 2/3rd of all Americans feel that drones effectively help combat the terrorist threat. Another poll published in May, 2013 by Pew Research Center reported that only 53% of the US public is "very concerned" with drone strikes endangering civilian lives, and another 32% reported deep concern over the possibility of blowback by extremists.⁷ The conventional wisdom of the American public regarding drone strikes is off the mark and short-sided in nature. With a large majority of Americans supporting drone strikes, there is failure to not only look at the ethical issues that are backed by numerous reports of staggering civilian casualties, but also the imminent threat of blowback and the erosion of stability among foreign governments in regions most affected by drone strikes.

Americans lack a well versed perspective to see how drones dropping 500 pound bombs into non-combat zones are in fact ineffective tools to secure the US from terror attacks.

All the issues arisen in fact go to show that these strikes subvert United States national security efforts to "win the hearts and minds" of those in the Middle East. An inactive civil society is at fault for overlooking the moral issues and latent effects this program is surely causing. By taking the long term perspective on the effects, we garner a greater understanding of the drone strikes impact. The 2013 Gallup Poll also highlighted

a salient issue with drones, that is just under half of Americans pay attention to the drone strikes abroad.⁸ With staggering disapproval internationally, even our closest allies such as Britain only have a 39% public approval of the drone strikes.⁹ Americans lack a well versed perspective to see how drones dropping 500 pound bombs into non-combat zones are in fact ineffective tools to secure the United States from terror attacks. Drones may often times devastate the enemy, but there lies many more consequences. From the aforementioned Gallup Poll we see that the conventional wisdom domestically is that the drone strikes are assisting the "War on Terror, however if we look at the ethical and legal issues with drones, real answer becomes more transparent (unlike the US drone program). The drone program is violating war ethics and consequently hurting foreign relations, increasing instability, and creating more militants in the process. The White House surely needs to understand that the consequential effects of drones will begin to continue to pop up, giving rise to the possibility of blowback that has become more than just speculation.

Realism and Blob Theory

The realist paradigm is most relevant in understanding the short sided policy United States' implementation of its drone program. As the realist founder Thucydides remarked "The strong do what they will, and the weak do what they must."¹⁰ This statement really resonates with both sides of the drone debate and terrorist thought. The United States pursues the drone strikes without real repercussions, while those who personally affected by the strikes are helpless and relatively disempowered in comparison to the world power. Realist theory projects the international system as an anarchical one, and no higher authority exists above the state. Hence states must then seek to protect their interests by increasing power and

6. Alyssa.Brown. Frank Newport "In U.S., 65% Support Drone Attacks on Terrorists Abroad." Gallup (March 25, 2013) <http://www.gallup.com/poll/161474/support-drone-attacks-terrorists-abroad.aspx>.

7. Bruce Drake, "Obama and Drone Strikes: Support but questions at home, opposition abroad." Pew Research. (May 24, 2013) <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/05/24/obama-and-drone-strikes-support-but-questions-at-home-opposition-abroad/>.

8. Global Attitudes Poll. "Global Indicators Database: Drone

Strikes" Pew Research 2013) <http://www.pewglobal.org/database/indicator/52>.

9. Brown, A. Newport, F. "In U.S., 65% Support Drone Attacks on Terrorists Abroad." Gallup (March 25,2013). <http://www.gallup.com/poll/161474/support-drone-attacks-terrorists-abroad.aspx>.

10. Quote from: Paul Viotti . Mark Kauppi. "Realism: The State and Balance of Power". International Relations Theory Longman. 2012. (40)

11. Ibid 10.

security.¹¹ Within the context of drones the United States Drone program, the administration is operating on a “defensive realist” strategy. Defensive realists at their basic level are “security maximizers.”¹² They avoid the offensive realist strategy of expansionism and aggression (power maximizing), holding that it is counterproductive towards the goal of security. Yet this paper shows that this “defensive” paradigm can be as equally harmful.

By using weaponized drones as opposed to boots on the ground in Yemen and Pakistan the United States is ostensibly following the principles of “defensive realism.” This is a change from the offensive realist strategy employed shortly after 9/11. With the drawback of troops in Iraq and soon from Afghanistan, the US has embarked on a “pseudo” defensive realist foreign policy strategy. They have begun placing emphasis on national security and avoiding the occupational roles they maintained in Iraq and Afghanistan from 2002-2011. By “pseudo” we mean there is less an emphasis on this aggressive narrative developed following 9/11, but the casualties show this in not necessarily the case. As previously outlined this falls directly in line with realist assumption of security being a central issue to the state.

Blob theory identified by Marc Sageman describes terrorists within the realm of a ‘social blob’. He maintains that “...Instead of a formal structure, this association, might be better conceptualized as a social blob, with vague, diffuse and porous boundaries. Many people flirt with the blob, and only a very few remain in it for a definite period of time.”¹³

Sageman depicts this ‘social blob’ by making a model of the actors involved in the Hofstad case. The Hofstad Network was a terrorist group, who committed the 2003 Casablanca suicide bombings in which 45 people were killed at a restaurant in the heart of the city.¹⁴ As the figure above denotes, there are three loosely fitting groups within this blob. The first are those that join for short periods of time, the “peripheral members” who may go to demonstration or meeting sponsored

by an insurgent group but never really get active in the movement.¹⁵ The second level of the blob rests “the followers, people who tag along, but would not, by themselves, have driven the plot. They can be as responsible or even more for atrocities, as they willingly and often enthusiastically carry out bombings. But they would not have done so by themselves.” Finally there is the active core, the leaders of terrorist cohorts; they are the driving force behind the movement, often remaining with the group for a long period of time.”¹⁶




Figure 9.1 Social Blob example using the Hofstad Case.

Blob theory, encompasses the process by which people go from being peripheral activists in radical movements, and subsequently become active members of a terrorist group or insurgency. It also accounts for the research behind the point of ‘moral outrage’ that pushes some from extremist belief into violent extremism. This recommendation will affirm how drone strikes ultimately represent this major moral violation, prompting a shift towards violence.

The following section will provide better understanding of the United States new foreign policy tool of choice, and counter intuitive effects it has on their policy initiative of attempting to win the ‘hearts and mind,’ and inevitably the war.

11. 12. Ibid 10.

13. “Theoretical Frames on Pathways to Violent Radicalization” ARTIS Scientific Research Group. P. 23. (August 2009) http://www.artisresearch.com/articles/ARTIS_Theoretical_Frames_August_2009.pdf.

14. Wikipedia source used as reference for death toll in the Casablanca bombings. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2003_Casablanca_bombings.

15. Ibid 13.

16. Ibid 13.



The Threat of Blowback via Drone Strikes

“Blowback is defined as an unforeseen and unwanted effect, result, or set of repercussions”¹⁷
- Merriam-Webster Dictionary

Blowback is an ongoing threat related to drone attacks, there is a growing consensus among many given in testimonials that make the case for drones being a direct catalyst of terrorist action. A fall 2011 issue of Middle East Policy Journal published data which highlights this point exactly. From 2008 to 2009 drone strikes drastically increased from 48 to 161 attacks.¹⁸ In direct consequence the US dealt with the Khost Bombing in 2009, during the attack, bomber known as Humam Khalil al-Balawi killed himself and ten others at Forward Operating Base Chapman in Pakistan.¹⁹ Interestingly enough at one time Al-Balawi was considered a close partner with the United States, collecting data for the C.I.A on Al-Qaeda. However prior to the bombing Al-Balawi gave a video testimonial in which he cited the drone strikes

in Zengara, Pakistan as his motivating factor behind the Khost bombing.²⁰ Another source confirms such blowback, Yemeni activist and writer Farea al-Muslimi spoke to the Senate Judiciary Committee on Constitution, Civil Rights, and Human Rights in April 2013. In her testimony Al-Muslimi brought up the issue of drone strike on her village which resulted in numerous civilian deaths and destroyed the structural integrity of the village.²¹ More importantly was that Al-Muslimi noted “Yemenis have begun to turn against the United States as a result of the civilian deaths and destruction caused by weaponized drone strikes.”²²

These are just a few of the numerous reports exposing the fallacy of drones’ positive impact on national security. It’s in fact turning an increasing number of civilians in states such as Pakistan and Yemen against the United States, and in some cases as evidenced by the Khost bombing directly harming American lives.

The human rights violations are become more frequent and continue to damage America’s ability to combat terrorism and provide stability to these regions.

17. “Blowback” as defined by Merriam-Webster online dictionary. <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/blowback>.

18. Colin Owens Hudon. Matt Flannes. “Drone Warfare: Blowback from the New American Way of War.” Middle East Policy Jour Leila nalSeptember 15, 2011. <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1475-4967.2011.00502.x/abstract>.

19. Ibid 13.

20. “CIA Bomber Vowing Revenge for Baitullah Mehsud’s Death,” YouTube, January 9, 2010. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HB1NJ8zOOso>; and Joby Warrick, *The Triple Agent: The Al-Qaeda Mole Who Infiltrated the CIA* (Random House, 2011).

21. Ryan Reilly. “Farea Al-Muslimi Says Drone Strike on Yemen Village ‘Tore My Heart.’” The Huffington Post. April 23, 2013 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/23/farea-al-muslimi-drone-strike_n_3142322.html.

22. Ibid 16.

“The persistence of these [drone] attacks on Pakistani territory offend people’s deepest sensibilities, alienates them from their government, and contributes to Pakistan’s instability.”

David Kilcullen brought this up in his New York Times piece, “Death From Above, Outrage Down Below.” Kilcullen points out that “drone strikes are extensively covered in Pakistan and are popularly believed to have killed even more civilians than is actually the case.”²³ He continues, “The persistence of these attacks on Pakistani territory offend people’s deepest sensibilities, alienates them from their government, and contributes to Pakistan’s instability.”²⁴ Regardless of accurate statistics, the problem is this perception adds to the growing disillusionment of American intervention within the Middle East. Without regional support, any western policies and establishments imbedded in society will surely crumble following troop drawback. Backing the claim for blowback and “fueled anti-Americanism” is the incident of the “Times Square Bomber.”²⁵ Aspiring bomber Faizel Ahshad told a judge that “New York City was a revenge for the death of Baitullah Mehsud” a Taliban militant who was killed in a drone strike.²⁶ Looking at this attempted attack, along with the Khost Bombing in 2009, there is without doubt evidence that blowback is occurring and will persist so long as the administration follows this cornerstone policy in the fight against terrorism.

As leading international relations scholar Michael Boyle writes, “The conventional wisdom of drone strikes effectiveness is undermined by numerous factors.” One being that drone strikes have become a tool for recruiting potential militants gaining support

of those whose lives have been torn apart by US drone strikes.²⁷ This brings to mind the term “Accidental Guerilla”²⁸ coined by David Kilcullen, he writes that many people who under normal circumstance never chosen the Jihadist path are resorting to such action because of these drone strikes. The consensus among most international relations scholars is quickly becoming that drones are in fact a tool for Al-Qaeda, keeping them relevant and garnishing support for their steadfast opposition towards the United States. Yemeni writer Ibrahim Mothana underlines these concerns: “Anti-Americanism is far less prevalent in Yemen than in Pakistan. But rather than winning the hearts and minds of Yemeni civilians, America is alienating them by killing their relatives and friends. Indeed, the drone program is leading to the ‘Talibanization’ of vast tribal areas and the radicalization of people who could otherwise be America’s allies in the fight against terrorism in Yemen.”²⁹ Keeping this commentary in mind, it has become a highly backed assertion that the drone strikes are in fact undermining the United States ability to combat extremists.

‘Civilian’ and ‘Militant’ Casualties in Yemen and Pakistan

Drone strikes are nowhere more prevalent than in Yemen and Pakistan, these countries bear the burden of most of these strikes. Just how damaging have these strikes been? Completely accurate data is hard to acquire, given many strikes go unreported, and the lines between ‘civilian’ and ‘militant’ is blurry at best. Yet as of 2014, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ) estimates that around 2,296-3,719 people have been killed with a possible 957 civilian casualties in Pakistan alone.³⁰ While in Yemen, the Bureau found a similar civilian/militant ratio where a reported 334-488 terrorists have been killed, of which an

23. David Kilcullen. Andrew Exum. “Death From Above, Outrage Down Below.” New York Times. May, 16, 2009 <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/17/opinion/17exum.html?pagewanted=all&r=0> accessed: March, 10, 2015

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. Michael, Boyle. “Costs and Consequences of Drone Warfare.” International Affairs Vol. 89, No. 1 pp. 1-29 (2013) Published by Wiley <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23479331>.

27. Ibid 20.

28. David Kilcullen. “Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small War in the Midst of a Big One.” (2009) Oxford University Press.

29. Ibrahim Mothana “How Drones Help Al-Qaeda.” New York Times. June 13, 2012 <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/14/opinion/how-drones-help-al-qaeda.html>.

30. Drone strike casualties derived from data collection between 2004-2014 providing an interactive mapping and reports on each strike “Drone Strikes in Pakistan” The Bureau of Investigative Journalism. (2004-2014) <http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drones/drones-pakistan/>.



Graffiti in Sana, Yemen, protests U.S. drone operations. (Photo Credit: Yahya Arhab / European Pressphoto Agency)

estimated 83 were civilians.³¹ These reports indicate the grotesque number of innocents killed by drones over the last few years and call into question the morality of such a weapon.

The 4th Geneva Conventions in 1949 established the norms of warfare regarding civilian personnel whereby the 4th Convention seeks to protect civilians and enemy combatants who lay down their arms.³² Under the broad outline of the fourth convention, it becomes obvious that the United States is in crude violation of the Geneva Conventions, given both Yemen and Pakistan are bound by it. Further researching drones within the political theory we can apply “Jus in Bello,” war ethics, which are the ethical and moral constraints necessary within warfare.³³ The second and fourth principle of “Jus in Bello” features principles the drone program is plainly conflicting with. The second principle states: “Spare non-combatants and other defenseless personnel,” and the fourth says: “Means not immoral per se: not indiscriminate of causing needless suffering.”³⁴ One distinct and disturbing contradiction

between the Geneva Conventions, Jus in Bello war principles, and United States use of these weapons was the strike on a Yemeni wedding convoy in May of 2013 killing eleven unarmed civilians.³⁵ With reports like these becoming commonplaces in recent years, how can there be any moral justification made for drones? Despite the militant casualties who are significant, wouldn’t the moral pitfalls significantly undermine how effective the program has become? The idea of proportionality of war also arises from the casualties of drone strikes, “If a 300 pound bomb can be used to destroy a target, a 10,000 pound bomb ought not to be used?”³⁶ In other words if a surgeon’s blade can do the job, why use the hammer. Using the Bureau’s estimates on drone strikes, one finds that a median estimate for civilian casualties in comparison to all drone deaths is roughly 30% in Pakistan, while Yemen this estimate lies around 20%.³⁷ This is an unacceptable reality, and is a stark contrast to President Obama’s speech at the National Defense University in May 2013 describing the strikes as “effective” and “legal.”³⁸

31. Drone strike casualties derived from data collection between 2002-2014 providing an interactive mapping and reports on each strike “Drone Strikes in Yemen” The Bureau of Investigative Journalism. (2004-2014) <http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drones/drones-yemen/>

32. Geneva Convention Relative to Protection of Civilian Person, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316.

33. Paul Viotti . Mark Kauppi “Chapter 9: Normative IR Theory: Ethics and Morality.” International Relations Theories (391-414) Longman publishing Copyright by Pearson Education 2012.

34. Ibid 27.

35. Robert Worth, “Drone Strike in Yemen Hits Wedding Convoy, Killing 11.” New York Times December 12, 2013 <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/13/world/middleeast/drone-strike-in-yemen-hits-wedding-convoy-killing-11.html>.

36. Ibid 27.

37. Ibid 25.

38. Released by The White House Office of Press Secretary. Quoting remarks by the President at the National Defense University in Washington D.C. on May 2013 defending the drone usage. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university>.

“Combat drones are battlefield weapons... drones are not lawful for use outside of combat zones...Yet the United States is failing to follow International Law”

In a congressional hearing to the subcommittee on national security and foreign affairs Professor of Law at Notre Dame Mary Elle O’Connell remarked: “Combat drones are battlefield weapons...drones are not lawful for use outside of combat zones. Yet the United States is failing to follow it (international law) more often than not.”³⁹ The question is then rendered, what defines a ‘battlefield’ and who actually poses a threat to national security. The United States current policy is to use this lethal threat away from battlefield putting it in direct conflict with international law. O’Connell also alludes to this definition in her testimony citing Afghanistan as an example where drone usage is justified, “The United States is currently in an armed conflict with Afghanistan...has tens of thousands of highly trained troops fighting a well-organized opponent.”⁴⁰ This is dissonance with the situation in Yemen and Pakistan where we do not have ground troops engaged in combat, thus rendering those regions “non-combat zones.”

Another problem is the collection of accurate data on ‘militant’ and ‘civilian’ casualties in drone strikes. This is because there is no clear definition of who poses a national security threat to the United States. The lines are further shrouded in secrecy by the administration’s lack of transparency on the subject. On top of that are many cases that go unreported or false reporting convolutes the accuracy. In the Congressional hearing on weaponized drones in 2010, O’Connell made the point that beyond the confines of an armed conflict, everyone is a civilian.⁴¹

This again brings ambiguity to the definition of who is ‘friend of foe’ in this war. According to a recent New York Times article “Mr. Obama embraced a disputed method for counting civilian casualties that did little to box him in. It in effect counts all military-age males in a strike zone as combatants, according to several administration officials, unless there is explicit intelligence posthumously proving them innocent.”⁴² In doing so the presidential administration has again gone after the establishment of protecting civilian personnel found in the 4th Geneva Convention. The 2010 congressional hearing was key initiative in trying to set some parameters for who is actually a ‘militant’ or ‘civilian’ by international standards, but inevitably no standardized definition was accepted.

Regardless of these ambiguous definitions of ‘militants’ the fact is around 4,000 lives in Pakistan and Yemen have ended as a result of these strikes, and there lies an overt violation of sovereign boundaries in these countries. The strikes also undermine legal guidelines established by international law that United States is not in ongoing “armed engagements” with. (This includes both Pakistan and Yemen).⁴³ The question rests do these strikes actually have positive impact on preventing terrorist incidents? The answer is resoundingly “no”. Terrorism incidents they have remained relatively stable since 1978, the difference is the perception of increased terrorist attacks.⁴⁴

Conclusively, how can this counter terrorism tactic be justified as maximizing security if there is lack of evidence to back drones’ positive impact in securing America? As highlighted in here, the casualties are immense, the results of this study shows a weak case to make in support of drones effectiveness in comparison to the loss in civilian life. This only serves to undermine America’s goal to capitalize on ‘soft power’ in the Middle East.

39. “Rise of the Drones II: Examining Legality of Unmanned Targeting.” Hearing Before the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs April 28, 2010. (serial no. 111-120).

40. Ibid 35.

41. Ibid 30.

42. Jo Becker. Scott Shane “Secret Kill List proves a Test of Obama’s Principles and Will.” New York Times, May 29, 2012.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/obamas-leadership-in-war-on-al-qaeda.html?pagewanted=1&r=1>.

43. Ibid 30.

44. John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart, “The Terrorism Delusion: America’s Overwrought Response to September 11th,” *International Security*, vol. 37, no. 1 (Summer 2012): 81-110.

Government Instability in Drone Strike Regions

As consequence of these drone strikes, local and national governments in regions most affected are being destabilized and losing legitimacy by the people. This poses numerous problems in the “War on Terror.” The comprehensive study “Global Terrorism Index” (2014) conducted by the Institute for Economics and Peace found there was a multivariate statistically significant relationship between political instability and terrorism. In Pakistan which has been victim to the majority of drone strikes, people have begun to align themselves with enemy groups rather than their established governments, due to inaction on the drone issue. This creates a “credibility gap” among the people and the democratically elected government in Pakistan.⁴⁵ This “credibility gap” seriously endangers the current regime’s hold on power, and increases the possibility of regional conflict between the government and their people.

A central strategy of the US counterterrorism policy is building up states such as Yemen, Pakistan, and Iraq so they can eventually prevent terrorism unassisted by US forces.⁴⁶ Furthermore, it is necessary to gain popular support and legitimacy from the people if a state is accomplishing this successfully.

The White House’s counter terrorism strategy has focused on, “...building security partnerships” by enhancing the capabilities of governments such as Pakistan and Yemen.⁴⁷ Yet a successful outcome in combating insurgent groups growing radicalization movement is contingent upon stabilizing states, and

preventing the regional conflict that has plagued the Middle East. When the European Security Strategy report was released it summarized the effects of intrastate conflict. One of their main summarized findings in the report was: “Conflict can lead to extremism, terrorism and state failure; it provides opportunities for terrorists to gain strength.”⁴⁸

The United States cannot afford another failed state in the Middle East. Both Iraq and Syria sit as potential victims to the ISIL insurgency. Pakistan is particularly susceptible to terrorist movements; especially fearful is its nuclear capabilities. Pakistan’s fragile democratic government must respond to quickly to public pressure questioning whether they are doing everything they can to prevent drone strikes. And facing this pressure they did, Pakistan’s prime minister publicly called for the US to stop the drone strikes within their borders.⁴⁹ Yemen has dealt with similar issues, and just as Pakistan it has never been able to fully control its vast territories.

However the issue of public resentment over the strikes has grown amid increased frequency of drone strikes. The people of Pakistan have begun to petition their government to call for a halt to US drone strikes. In Northern Waziristan (Pakistan’s tribal region) tribesman gathered in protest declaring that they would attack Pakistani forces if the US did not stop all attacks.⁵⁰ The reactions made by the tribesman are not uncommon in Pakistan and many countries in the MENA region. Dozens of Yemeni’s gathered to protest drones back in January of 2013.⁵¹ Tensions in Pakistan reached a boiling point in November 2013, when tens thousands of protestors flocked to the streets of Peshawar,

45. Quoted in Glyn Williams, ‘The CIA’s covert predator drone war in Pakistan 2004–2010’, p. 881.

46. Ibid 21.

47. The White House, ‘National Strategy for Counterterrorism’, Washington DC, June 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism_strategy.pdf.

48. Solana, J. “A Secure Europe in a Better World.” (European Security Strategy 2003) European Union Institute For Security Studies (December 12, 2003) <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>.

49. Declan Walsh “Pakistan’s New Premier, Again Calls for an End to Drone Strikes”, New York Times, June 13, 2013. <http://>

www.nytimes.com/2013/06/06/world/asia/pakistan-nawaz-sharif-election-drone-strikes.html?pagewanted=all.

50. Rob Crilly, “Protest against American Drone Attacks in Northern Pakistan”, The Telegraph, June 28, 2011. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/8586658/Protests-against-American-drone-attacks-in-northern-Pakistan.html>.

51. Mohammed Ghobari, “Yemeni tribesman protest drone strikes”, Reuters January 4, 2013. <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/01/04/uk-yemen-drones-protest-idUKBRE9030J920130104>.



Pakistan to protest the American drone program.⁵² The United States should use the situation in Pakistan and Yemen as examples of what they must avoid in Iraq and Syria where public opinion is so divided. Drone strikes have been reported most notably in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and Afghanistan.⁵³ All of these regions have been plagued with revolts and instability. The fact that anti-Americanism seems to be a value held by many in these regions, goes to show that United States is actually crippling their ability as “security maximizers” within the defensive realist ideal.

Unfortunately those affected by drone warfare cannot hold the United States accountable for their actions; therefore they turn to their own governments to halt the attacks. Despite the protests there is little action taken, and this comes down to economic incentives. While governments publicly condemn the American drone program, they are supporting the efforts in private. Why is this case? The United States pumps mass amounts of money into these foreign governments, since November 2011, US assistance to Yemen has totaled more than \$800 million,⁵⁴

even more astonishing is another \$7.5 billion went to Pakistan over a five year period from 2010 to 2014.⁵⁵ These governments are left with no option but compliance with American policy. Nevertheless this comes at an unforeseen cost, a weakened state and heightened conflict, which leads to extremism.

When faced with this predicament, where can the local populace turn to for support? Right into the hands of anti-American militant groups such as the Islamic State and the Levant, who are on the forefront of American opposition. These two countries serve as ideal case studies for the negative after-effects of drone warfare. If the program expands broadly in the Arab region the consequence could be dire, and counterproductive. The United States aggressively trying to heal the ‘occupational’ image abroad and halt the spread of ISIL to other Arab regions. Yet the drone strikes establish precedence for moral outrage aimed at the perpetrator, in this case the US. This sets the precedent for a loss in legitimacy, control over the people, and potentially increased recruits for the ISIL; all which can seriously erode American security in the long run.

52. Salman Masood, “Thousands in Pakistan Protest American Drone Strikes”, New York Times. November 23, 2013 http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/24/world/asia/in-pakistan-rally-protests-drone-strikes.html?_r=0.

53. “Drone Warfare”, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (2014). <http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drones/drones-war-drones/>.

54. State Department report on economic assistance given to Yemen released on August 14, 2014. “Support for Yemen”. <http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/2014/222781.htm>.

55. “Aid To Pakistan By the Numbers.” Center for Global Development. (2013)

Implications of America's Drone Program

Contrary to conventional wisdom and the belief among the Obama administration that drones are ethical and effective foreign policy tools. This closer examination reveals that America's drone program is crossing moral and legal boundaries resulting in the death over one thousand civilians in total.⁵⁶ This has shown too often cross the moral boundaries, prompting some people move towards being an active member in congruence with the fluidity of this ever changing 'blob' of terrorism and turning towards violence. Blowback against the persons who have been affected by these strikes is now a certainty. These strikes that intend to make America safe from terrorism are in fact doing the antithesis. As previously cited, blowback has become an imminent threat well beyond mere speculation. If the Khost Bombing and Times Square Bomber attempt is any indication, the latent consequences of drones are sure to persist.

While the paper focuses on the regions' most afflicted by drone strikes, they serve as case studies that have broader implications on how the strikes motivate people to commit acts of terror. Drone strikes also serve as a recruiting vessel, whereby if a person has been afflicted by these strikes they are likely to join an opposition movement given their governments are unlikely to stand up against the United States. With the ISIL insurgency growing to a possible 31,500 fighters and millions are living under its rule. In ISIL occupied territories there is a deep hatred for non-believers and notably the United States. If American drone strikes are significantly reduced, it would serve to undermine misperceptions of America and hinder part of ISIL's recruiting base.

Currently these drone strikes only reinforce the negative misconception that many Middle Easterners share of an "Anti-Islamic America," as well as a general carelessness for the value of human life. In

such a critical period with the rise of ISIL and similar insurgent groups, the US cannot accept a failure to maintain human rights in the Middle East, it only reaffirms ISIL anti-American message with civilian casualties serving as a sounding board for effective recruitment.

Title: The United States Drone Program: Ethics and Blowback

Policy Recommendation: Scale Back the Use of Weaponized Drones in Non-Combat Zones

Author: Casey Higginbotham

56. *Totals published using the high estimate of civilians killed in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia from the start of the drone program until 2014. The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (2014)<http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drones/drones-graphs/>

Analyzing EU's stance towards Turkey after the military operation in Syria

Sascha Salfelder

Introduction

NATO welcomed Turkey in 1952 to contain Communist expansion after the Cold War and gain a foothold close to the Middle East. Turkey's relationship with NATO has been fluctuating but survived all these years for mutual benefits. Turkey has the second largest army within the organization after the US and provides permanent naval assistance to NATO missions. Turkey also hosts many NATO initiatives. In 2018, Turkey contributed \$101 million to the NATO common funding.

The European Union, which Turkey still aspires to formally join, expressed their anger over Turkey's offensive actions in Syria in October 2019, and threatened sanctions particularly after President Erdogan's warning that he would "open the gates" and send 3.6 million refugees to Europe if they did not support him. European countries fear that the assault on Kurdish forces could trigger a devastating shift in the region's balance of power, and strengthen Islamic State terrorist group.

Europe also warned Turkey that its action would create another humanitarian crisis and have severe consequences. The World Food Programme of United Nations has released warnings that Turkish attack on Syria has already displaced 70,000 Syrians. However Turkish Foreign Minister informed NATO members that no other NATO country had suffered more from the terrorist attacks than Turkey.

EU's stance towards Turkey

The European Union, which Turkey still aspires to formally join, has expressed their anger over

Turkey's offensive in Syria and threatened sanctions particularly after President Erdogan's warning that he would "open the gates" and send 3.6 million refugees to Europe if they did not support him. Western countries fear that the assault on Kurdish forces could trigger a devastating shift in the region's balance of power, and strengthen Islamic State terrorist group.

Condemning Turkey's action, European Council President Donald Tusk warned Turkey and made it clear that, EU will never accept that refugees are weaponized and used to blackmail the European state.

Other European leaders also condemned Turkey's actions and demanded that the UN's security council must immediately address the issue. Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte accused Erdogan of blackmail and said the military operation should immediately end.

French leaders even proposed economic sanctions on Turkey, and Former French President François Hollande has asked the NATO military alliance to strip Turkey of its membership for launching the attack in Syria. French leaders also officially termed the Kurds as "allies who led the fight against Daesh (Islamic State)". French leaders vowed to take serious measures in this regard and cannot let the Kurds to be massacred by Turkish Forces.

Sweden's parliament also demanded EU arms embargo, as Swedish Foreign Minister Ann Linde said, Turkey has violated international law, destabilized the situation and risked having great humanitarian consequences. Netherlands has also decided to withhold all license applications for the export of military goods to Turkey pending the course of the situation. Greek Prime Minister

Mitsotakis also called on NATO to increase naval patrols in the Aegean Sea after a threat by Turkey to open Europe's doors to more than three million migrants.

However, countries like Hungary, Serbia and Bulgaria opposed majority of the EU states' stance towards Turkey and voiced against sanctions and rejected EU statement criticizing Turkey. Hungarian Foreign Minister urged EU to have a dialogue with Turkey and address their concerns.

Bulgarian leaders also condemned the criticism and said it will not stop a wave of refugees from Turkey if Ankara opens its borders. Both Serbia and Bulgaria considers Turkey a vital partner and view their relations with Turkey more important.

Turkey's concerns

It seemed Turkey was ready to even negotiate to get a membership in EU but a lot changed after Erdoğan seen as champion of the Muslim Brotherhood whose government is accused of democratic backsliding and criticized for crackdown on journalists and political dissenters.

Dissimilar to Turkey, Kurd people are not as religious and conservative (such as their women are quite modern and in fact fight alongside men) and have views that are close to the western states and uphold western values of democracy which is why they are naturally liked by the US and Europeans and were chosen as allies in the region to fight ISIS.

As Turkey was about to launch its Operation in Northern Syria on October 8, 2019, French President Emmanuel Macron held meeting with Jihane Ahmed, a representative of Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).

French officials called the meeting as "France's solidarity with Kurds in their fight against Islamic State in the region", although, the two sides also discussed the Turkish operation and reviewed a

possible cooperation against Turkey.

France remains "very worried" about the prospect of a Turkish military operation in Syria.

However, the French officials also conceded that the meeting was also an opportunity to reiterate that France remains "very worried" about the prospect of a Turkish military operation in Syria.

On October 09, 2019 the French Consul General to the Kurdistan Region, Olivier Decottignies during a meeting with Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) leader Masoud Barzani assured him of all possible support to Kurdish people and administration to meet with new situation. The meeting at KDP headquarters outside Erbil was also attended by several other Kurdish officials including security chiefs.

Barzani who also maintain working relationship with Turkey was reluctant to ask for any military support but sought French and European support against Turkey's "safe zone" policy.

In a clear message to Turkey, it was announced in France that French naval frigate has set from coast of Toulon, France to Cypriot waters to take part in French-Cyprus naval maneuvers the east Mediterranean.

The French Naval ships arrived at a time when Turkey decided to send its own ship, escorted by warships, to start drilling off Turkish Cyprus region where Greece-backed Cyprus had licensed French energy company Total and Italian partner Eni to explore for gas.

The European Union has joined Greece, and Greek Cyprus governments to condemned Turkey's gas search. On October 12, 2019 Greek Cypriot Defense Minister Savvas Angelides also made clear of their agenda that the Cyprus-French maneuver

was aimed at sending a direct message to Turkey.

France and Germany's decision to halt arms export to Turkey

France and Germany have announced to temporarily halt arms exports to Turkey over the country's military incursion into northern Syria. According to German leaders, their Federal Government has announced not to issue any new permits for all military equipment that could be used by Turkey in Syria. Florence Parly, the French Minister of the Armed Forces, also issued a similar statement. France announced that, pending the cessation of the Turkish offensive in North-East Syria, France has decided to suspend any plans to export to Turkey war materials that could be used in the context of this offensive.

European members of the UN Security Council also called for an immediate halt to the offensive and expressed deep concerns over the Turkish military operation. The UNSC's five European members — Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, and Poland made a joint statement, and urged that renewed armed hostilities in the northeast will further undermine the stability of the whole region, exacerbate civilian suffering and provoke further displacements in the region, which may cause more troubles for the European nations.

In addition, some 20,000 people took to the streets of Paris and other European cities on October 12. Marching under the Kurdish flag, they called Turkish President Erdogan a terrorist and even protested against Donald Trump who they felt have betrayed the Kurd people of the region.

European countries heavily rely on Ankara to curb the arrival of refugees into Europe following a 2016 agreement under which Turkey agreed to prevent refugees from leaving towards Europe in exchange for six billion euros (\$6.63bn) – most of which has been disbursed – and visa-free travel for its citizens, but has frequently criticized the lack of assistance from Brussels.

Turkish President's threat has worried the European leaders, some of whom agree that Erdogan is not bluffing, and that Turkey could send about 500,000 refugees immediately. Europe might be angry at this invasion of Syria but Europe is powerless in front of the refugee threat but the Americans are not, and President Trump consider this not a direct challenge for the United States. The European leaders hope to convince President Trump to make a deal with Turkish President Erdogan and use American power to keep him in line. However, the Europeans are also aware of the fact America is least concerned about Europe, and more eager to deal with North Korean, Iran and Afghan issues.

Turkey has legitimate security concerns, NATO expect Turkey to act with restraint and focus on the common enemy – Da'esh

On October 11, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg visited Turkey and met Turkish President and Foreign Minister and urged to avoid any unilateral actions that may further destabilize the region, escalate tensions and case human suffering. He underlined that while Turkey has legitimate security concerns, NATO expect Turkey to act with restraint and focus on the common enemy – Da'esh. However, NATO realizes the importance of Turkey and appreciated Turkey's commitments and contributions to NATO.

Turkey's relationship with NATO has been fluctuating but survived all these years for mutual benefits. Turkey has the second largest army within the organization after the U.S. and provides permanent naval assistance to NATO missions. Turkey also hosts many NATO initiatives. In 2018, Turkey contributed \$101 million to the NATO common funding.

However, NATO disappointed Turkey more than once over the decades such as when the U.S. refused to side with the Turkish invasion of

Cyprus in 1964, when Germany accused Turkey of killing civilians in its battle with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in the 1990s, and also due to America's refusal to hand over Fethullah Gulen.

Turkey's fight against terrorism, particularly the PKK, has been seen as the west as an act of brutality against civilians whereas Ankara is furious over the U.S. support for the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) which Turkey deems is dominated by YPG/PKK (a faction of Syria's Kurd) with links to militants who have waged insurgency in Turkey.

There have also been some small but humiliating incidents for Turkey such as in 2017 when a picture of Turkey's founding leader Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was placed among the pictures of "enemy states" during a joint NATO military exercise in Norway. NATO chief later apologized to Turkey.

Conclusion

The U.S. remains the decisive actor in the conflict and most European countries depend on the United States and US-led NATO alliance. The EU could not do much against Turkey after the launch of Syrian operation mainly due to the fact that the U.S. did not support any firm actions against Turkey as it would lead to further destabilization of the whole region and threaten the U.S. interests in the Middle East.

One important reason that the U.S. President has conceded to Turkish pressure is that the U.S. is not in a position to risk lives of U.S. soldiers in Syria particularly at a time when presidential elections is due in the U.S. and also Donald Trump's Middle East peace initiative has fell flat while his dream to reach an agreement with North Korea also broken apart.

Incirlik - the US air base in Turkey - is storing reportedly 50 air-dropped thermonuclear bombs in southern Turkey, less than 100 miles from the Syrian border where this conflict is taking place.

The reason why the U.S. or any European country would not provoke a direct confrontation with Turkey is because Ankara has over four hundred thousand strong armed forces. Turkey's Air Force is considered one of the strongest in the region. Of 333 combat aircraft, Turkey has 300 F-16 Fighting Falcons, 53 older generation F-5 fighter planes, 280 fighter/ground attack planes (variants of the F-16) and 31 U.S.-origin C-130 transport aircraft. Recently, United States suspended Turkey's involvement in the F-35 program in a dispute over Ankara's decision to buy Russian S-400 air defense systems.

However, the U.S. weapons are being used on both sides of the current conflict in Syria. The rifles, ammunition, and rocket launchers being used by Kurdish forces are U.S.-supplied as well as some of the Turkey's fighter planes, tanks, and bombs. Syrian opposition – including Syrian Kurdish forces – have received roughly \$2 billion in U.S. "train and equip" assistance, including a \$300 million request in 2019, according to Center for International Policy's Security Assistance Monitor.

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